
The picket
The picket called for 6am on Wednesday September 11, the opening day of Land Forces, was the event that attracted the biggest crowd, and for many comrades defined their experience of the DLF mobilisation. The police brutality unleashed upon us on that morning was overwhelming and was accompanied by over 75 random, highly aggressive arrests. Police raids and further arrests are still occurring at the time of writing (December 24).
Over the course of that Wednesday morning, activists tried out an array of tactics to block, disrupt and dispirit the weapons dealers entering the expo. Many comrades described the morning as chaotic, confusing, frustrating and ultimately disappointing. Others report a sense of elation, especially in the early period of the picket, and describe the energy of the scene as electric, amazing, empowering. People attempted to address the vicious policing they were encountering and to stay active: to disrupt traffic, hold spaces, keep themselves and friends safe and to open movement opportunities for others. It was complex and dangerous terrain. Some people felt distressed or concerned by an apparent lack of coordination or clarity on the ground within the community of gathered activists. A major source of discontent for many comrades was the realisation that Socialist Alternative, or Salt, were ‘in charge’ as the group leading the event.
I thought it was highly unfortunate that Socialist Alternative were in control at the crucial 6am beginning of the Wednesday blockade. I don’t know how that happened or if it could have been avoided but I think it should be prevented in future if at all possible.
Anna 26
One aspect of direct action that people need to learn about is that it requires a high level of trust between comrades for it to be successful. It is particularly crucial that comrades are able to trust the people leading the action. It was not appropriate that Salt had exclusive leadership over the 6am Wednesday direct action. They are the least trusted political grouping on the Australian far left.
Carmen 23

DLF organisers have heard and reflected on these criticisms in our own spaces and with community in our evaluation sessions. We want to offer here some notes about Salt’s participation in the mobilisation, an iteration of the ways we tried to mitigate harm, and some thoughts about how we could have done better.
By the time of our launch of the Disrupt Land Forces mobilisation on June 21st, Salt was already organising in the space and had announced a picket and rally for Wednesday September 11. We do not control the space of protest, nor would we attempt to. Our way of working is to provide resources for different communities to work together, to encourage collaboration and also to remain open to the possibility of independent / autonomous actions. We do not see ourselves as the bosses or the managers of the mobilisation, more as hosts or facilitators. DLF collaborators had no power to require another group or person to NOT deploy a tactic or run an event. Still, it was not ideal that the necessary coordination for such a large singular tactic shifted away from the collaboration to the organisers of that event.
Salt attended the June 21 meeting launching the mobilisation and appeared willing to work collaboratively on the mobilisation. Post-meeting, however, collaboration was limited to one Salt organiser communicating with one DLF organiser. We asked several times for Salt to meet with us, both inviting them to our meetings and offering to go to theirs. This was turned down. We sent suggestions about managing police tactics; these were ignored.
What should we have done? What did we do?
As we got closer to Land Forces we became increasingly nervous about the prospect of police violence during the Wednesday morning event. Our more senior organisers were very worried. We convened a meeting of DLF organisers to consider how to mitigate the harm we predicted would be inflicted during the picket. As one comrade commented,
The picket needed a lot more tactical thought, planning and an effective strategy and what was sought to be achieved, both in terms of physical disruption as well educationally for people who were not there.
Kara, 28

DLF organisers did not take on the role of planning an effective strategy for the Wednesday picket; it was not ‘our’ event. We did, however, give the event some tactical thought, with a harm minimisation lens. We suggested that people deploy in pods of 10-15 people, that pods approach from multiple directions, stay away from the crowd, avoid police lines, take care of each other and remain alert to threats and opportunities. We hoped that by mobilising in groups dispersed out across the zone, and by steering clear of police lines, pods might find ways to be disruptive without experiencing riot cop and police horse charges, chemical and projectile weapons and baton beatings. Many people tried out the pod idea, with varied success; this tactic is discussed below.
There are a couple of things we identified, in retrospect, that may have enabled the movement to make better decisions about the picket. We could have made it much clearer that the Wednesday picket was a Students for Palestine aka Salt event. We could have organised our own event on the Wednesday morning, at the other end of MCEC, giving people a choice about which group to work with. We could have organised to go to a weapons corporation that morning, staying completely away from MCEC. We regret that we did not identify these possibilities ahead of time. We were all dismayed to see our worst fears realised and exceeded on the ground. As one person noted
There was significant discord between Salt and the anarchist groups organising. It seemed like a strange coalition to lead an action this important, when these groups can’t effectively communicate with each other or have a united approach. Salt was splitting the crowd in their usual way, which meant the risk for remaining people was even more amplified.
Kara, 28

Many activists were critical of Salt’s leadership during the picket, while others criticised the use of the term ‘picket’ for the event.
I was horrified by the brutality. I’m so angry at Salt. They should not have called it a picket.
Phaedra, 36
Salt should not have been allowed to run the main rally.
Alba, 62
Salt set the blockade up for failure. Their entire strategy consisted of yelling at people to run in a particular direction with no explanation. All that running and yelling did not achieve anything. It did not educate anyone. It did not build trust or solidarity. It just threw things into confusion. There wasn’t even a proper sound system, only megaphones. I don’t know if Salt brought a proper PA or not but the megaphones were not loud or clear enough to properly convey instructions. The incoherent yelling mainly just raised tensions.
Sami, 37
There was no PA system or other effective way to communicate with protesters.
Colin, 66
In terms of commitment, I rate today [Wednesday 11] at 10/10. For leadership, minus 50. There was no leadership.
Tariq, 47

DLF organisers had not planned for a picket but had tried to socialise a strategy of disrupting the bump in rather than blockading the building during the expo. We knew the police would have the building locked down and were concerned about how vicious the police would become if we challenged their control of the space. Understandably, people were drawn to confront the weapons dealers face to face, and the picket drew thousands of activists. The successes and failures of tactics used that morning gave rise to fruitful discussions in the evaluation sessions. The lack of orientation and communication was mentioned by many. Then, amid the chaos, there were moments of elation:
You were bloody marvellous.
Hannah, 75, who watched it on TV.
We made good work on the gate at the front entrance and broke it down. If we had had the whole crew (like we had at 7am) we actually could have stormed in and vandalised it before they start arresting everyone.
Piotr, 51
I loved the moment that the fence was taken down.
Marta, 32
I ended up on the bridge with a small group, yelling at delegates. Being part of a collective action felt very important.
Eddy, 24
Taking Wurunderi Way was amazing. The energy was incredible. There was real power, I can’t describe it, it was … incredible.
Sally, 60
The Crown and DFO were actually important pinch points because of the disruption to non-involved parties. Closing down DFO was a significant disruption.
Zazi, 33
After I was arrested I could hear the police on the radio talking about all the different challenges they were facing from us and that was empowering. It made me aware that I was a part of something much bigger.
Lily, 28
It was overwhelming but I felt connected to the other attendees, I felt we had each other’s backs, I felt secure enough to find my voice, lead chants for the first time ever, and check on people who were having a tougher time. I am proud of everyone who participated. I am excited to think of creative measures to have a bigger impact.
Percy, 33

There is a question and a tension arising from the picket experience about authority or leadership. What sort of authority is required to move a section of the crowd, who may be difficult to move and are likely to be following “someone with a megaphone”? What happens if someone sees a real opportunity? How do they build the authority to move a part of the crowd or encourage the movement of part of the crowd? At one point Zazi wanted to move people from the bridge around to the Whiteman Corner but didn’t feel like she had the authority to do so. Would ‘picket captains’ be the answer to these questions? Would we need a ‘quick decision team’, where a small group is empowered to lead a crowd into opportunities and away from threats? How do we organise a flat but not leaderless structure, where people are cooperating in large sets or groups and some people are given the ‘authority’ to move sections of the crowd? Organisers reflected on these questions at length; the conversation is ongoing.
The knowledge related to experiential street protesting is greatly underestimated; we need to find ways to draw on that knowledge better.
We never got to have the discussion or workshop or thinking space about how to split up the crowd as necessary and take different spaces.
With whom would we need to discuss that beforehand? Would we set up a consultative group of some kind?
Celia, 59
Clearing that big intersection was a priority of the government. Training and preparation were necessary to hold that big intersection, and to move people from one place to another.
Jason, 42

A lack of clear organisation and direction meant that more injuries and arrests took place, but I was impressed with the occupation. It was clear that police orders were to clear that intersection. The Public Order Response unit was able to make advances, and I think it’s clear that with more organisation we could’ve held that intersection better.
Colin, 66
I think DLF marshals are needed, who hold people to account to “do no harm” but also stay on chats and help marshal us to spread out.
Zazi, 33
One person suggested linking arms to create a human wall. This was tried by some comrades at the picket, but did not slow down the steroid fueled riot police charges. It’s worth considering all tactics, however; where we don’t succeed, we can learn, where we succeed, we can also learn.
The advantage of traditional blockade tactics of linking arms in lines three deep or more is that it builds a solid, united bunch of people. Sometimes that kind of solid human wall is enough to repel police violence. And even if that bunch of people get brutalised by police, at least they have had the experience of having gone through it together, not as isolated individuals running in every direction.
Mark, 34
This was our first attempt of addressing a big event – disrupting that MCEC space – for most of us. So there were things we really learned.
Carl, 22

Other aspects of the picket are considered in sections on the violence and pods. A mobilisation is a multi-activity, multi-tactic event built upon a base of community to drive a campaign forward. Many people’s experience of the week-long mobilisation was limited to the Wednesday morning tactic, which may indicate a limited imagination about “mobilisations” as intensive strategic periods of action. The mobilisation ran from Sunday 8 through to Friday 13, including First Nations truth telling, frontline stories, workshops, marches, a motorcade, speak outs, a vigil, a rally, a canoe intervention, a zombie dance event and a smoking ceremony. There were moments of radical honesty, joyful community, connection and staunch resistance throughout the week. We want to honour the strong feelings comrades have expressed about the picket and also hold the beauty and power of the whole of the mobilisation in view. As we go through arrest support and court processes, we hope to consolidate our commitment to everyone impacted and strengthen bonds of solidarity.

The pods
A tactic we invited people to try during the picket was to mobilise in groups of 10-15 humans, or ‘pods’. We suggested that each pod self-organise with an appointed ‘watcher’ who would look out for threats and opportunities. We asked pods to approach MCEC from a distance, from dispersed locations, and to avoid police lines. A couple of hundred people tried the tactic of mobilising in pods, with some success and much failure.
We workshopped moving and acting as a pod over the weekend at Seafarers, emphasising care, noticing strengths and staying attuned to vulnerabilities in the pod. Workshoppers identified the very young, the elderly, people of colour, anyone whose movement is compromised, and very tall men as among those who might need particular care within their pod. (Police and other thugs often pick on tall men).
The crew from Ngunnawal country arrived and activated as a pod throughout the mobilisation.
This model worked really well for us. We went to the training at Seafarers and that helped us think about how to move as a group, how to ensure everyone is safe. Our pod is still connected and organising together now.
It would have been good to have a way to communicate horizontally, across all the pods. Maybe in future each pod can have a burner phone, all connected together in a Signal chat, so that we can give on site updates, call out for help, say where we are and stuff.
Misha, 28
Pods becoming affinity groups and affinity groups becoming pods was the goal DLF organisers were aiming for, and the Ngunnawal crew had a great experience of pod-forming. Misha identifies a key issue regarding communications, however. With pods dispersed all over the protest space, how can we coordinate and draw on our collective power when we need to? We had hoped that the Telegram chat would serve that purpose but it didn’t. The absence of horizontal – or vertical – communication was especially hard on the people at the picket, where both our effectiveness and our safety were compromised.

A number of people felt that pod mobilisation was a good idea that had capacity to grow, and that it was worth trying further.
The pod idea was okay. It didn’t work because it really was not fulfilled or expressed possibly.
Iain, 26
It’s going to take time, building community and practicing those skills in small groups, how to move and behave and take initiatives. It will take education and time and practice.
Maz, 57
I was welcomed to an anonymous autonomous pod. We were able to decide who is and isn’t arrestable, we shared PPE and legal aid details. We stuck together for the first few hours of 11/9. I eventually felt empowered enough to break off from them and engage with strangers in the crowd.
Percy, 33
We should stick with the pod idea. Come and practice! and we’ll have it nailed in the future.
Marigold, 54
We needed a way to communicate between the pods. Each pod needs to be in relationship with the other pods. Maybe each pod could have a colour, a flag, a way to identify. Maybe each pod could have a comms person to join an in-action spokes council.
Zazi, 33
Small groups could be effective while bulk of police were busy with the big group.
Vlad, 51

Various people felt that the pod idea had failed, overwhelmed by the large crowd, the megaphones and ultimately by the police violence.
The pod idea didn’t work because people in smaller groups got left vulnerable. People got kettled in small numbers.
Lily, 28
It takes time to know people in a pod. Frankly, it didn’t work.
Ahmed, 40
People will follow the megaphone.
Yiannis, 35
Once things got really hectic it was impossible to stay connected as a group of ten, it was more like groups of 2 or 3. That was all we could manage, to look out for one or two other people.
Sandy, 16
We need a leadership team for a group 1000+ people, not a DIY into pods. People did not stick to their pods, if they formed one that day. We all congregated together which I think is safer and it’s what people are used to.
I found the pod idea to be useful to group stragglers so they don’t feel alone, and they have someone to look to and look after, and loners are less likely to quit and head home.
We should keep doing this pod idea but make it localised, like “Mernda line pod”.
Anna, 26
We tried a new thing and this has generated learnings. Did the pod idea work? Not really. Might it work? With more preparation and a solid internodal communication system, maybe? Having one person from each pod tasked with communications, and networked with all the other pods, was one idea circulated. Other suggestions included using a spokescouncil system during pod mobilisations, using flags to call a council or to signal other initiatives, preparing pods more thoroughly and in a coordinated way, using large rallies to practice mobilising as pods, forming into pods a month before a mobilisation, basing pods on locality and developing an overall strategy for pod deployment. Most comrades felt that mobilising as pods could be fabulous, but that we need to practice and modify the design. For now, we are keeping pods on the table of possible tactics for future mobilisations.
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